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PROTECTING FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE: SOLUTIONS IN THE DIGITAL 
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 
 
Katherine A. Franco1
Since the development of the General Public License, Free and 
Open Source Software (FOSS) developers have used copyright law to 
protect their software even while the goals of legally protecting FOSS 
often run contradictory to the policies behind the Copyright Act.  
Fundamental to FOSS licenses is the requirement that source code remains 
accessible, under the notion that this openness promotes greater progress 
in FOSS development and results in more robust software.  However, 
because of the prevalent distribution of source code, FOSS is particularly 
vulnerable to copyright infringement.  FOSS developers have 
preemptively protected their works by inventively licensing their work to 
the public.  However, enforcing FOSS licenses through traditional 
litigation under the Copyright Act has proven challenging. 
 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides legal protection 
that arises along with the exclusive rights traditionally provided to authors, 
including protection for technological measures that control access, 
protection for technological measures that protect exclusive rights of a 
copyright owner, and protection for the integrity of copyright management 
information (CMI).  However, these extra protections are seemingly 
counterintuitive to the fundamentals of FOSS licenses, which seek to 
make their copyrighted works more accessible and less restricted.   
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This article focuses on the provisions of the DMCA covering CMI.  
These provisions have rarely been litigated or otherwise analyzed.  
However, a review of court decisions regarding the CMI provisions of the 
DMCA suggest that they may prove to be particularly beneficial in 
protecting FOSS projects because of the emphasis by FOSS camps in 
managing FOSS licenses.  Just as FOSS camps have traditionally utilized 
copyright protection that is seemingly in opposition to FOSS goals to 
created legal safeguards for their works, similar results can, and should, be 
achieved using the CMI provisions of the DMCA. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Implicit within the [General Public License]'s preamble was a profound 
message: instead of viewing copyright law with suspicion, hackers should view it as yet 
another system begging to be hacked.”2  Traditionally, Free and Open Source Software 
(FOSS) is used as a means for developing software such that the source code remains 
open and available to the public.3  However, the public availability of source code and 
the massively communal development methods that are inherent to FOSS projects often 
run askew from the typical goals of software copyright protection embedded in 
intellectual property law.  United States copyright law as it pertains to software provides 
authors of original works the exclusive rights to copy the work, distribute the work, and 
create derivative works.4  An infringement claim arises when a party breaches any of 
these exclusive rights reserved for the copyright owner.5  The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) created several more causes of action that may arise in addition 
to the traditional exclusive rights provided to a copyright owner under the copyright 
statute.6  Generally, FOSS camps have advocated against enforcement of the DMCA, 
most often because of the anti-circumvention provisions it provides.7
                                                     
2  Sam Williams, Free as in Freedom: Richard Stallman’s Crusade for Free Software 123 
(2002), available at http://www.oreilly.com/openbook/freedom (describing Richard Stallman 
reluctantly accepting copyright law and developing the GNU General Public License). 
  However, the 
DMCA provides other provisions, including those regarding copyright management 
3  See, e.g., Richard Stallman, Why “Open Source” Misses the Point of Free Software, 
Comm. ACM, June 2009, at 31-33 (discussing that Free Software and Open Source Software 
both provide users and developers with source code, though for different ideological reasons); 
Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The Enforceability of 
Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 Va. J.L. & Tech 11, 71-72 (2000) (noting that both 
camps emphasize the importance of the availability of the source code in software development, 
while the differences in the two camps lies in the terms allowed in software licenses). 
4  See Raymond T. Nimmer, The Law of Computer Technology § 1:16 (2009) (describing 
the exclusive rights granted under copyright law for software). 
5  See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006) (“The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under 
a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any 
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.”). 
6  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (providing causes of action for anti-circumvention); 17 
U.S.C. § 1202 (2006) (providing causes of action related to protection of copyright management 
information); see also Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and 
Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 161, 163-65 (1997) (discussing copyright 
protection under the DMCA). 
7  See, e.g., Richard Stallman, Misinterpreting Copyright - A Series of Errors, in Free 
Software, Free Society: Selected Essays of Richard M. Stallman, 79, 84 (2002) (warning of the 
overly restrictive nature of the DMCA, specifically in providing anti-circumvention protection). 
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information (CMI) protection. This article proposes that a review of court decisions 
regarding the CMI provisions of the DMCA suggest that those provisions may prove to 
be beneficial in protecting FOSS projects because of the emphasis by FOSS communities 
in managing FOSS licenses. 
Section II of this article discusses in greater detail how software is intended to be 
protected under the copyright law and, more specifically, how FOSS is generally 
protected using the copyright statute.  Further, Section II describes the difficulties in 
protecting FOSS in an infringement suit.  FOSS developers have found creative ways to 
make copyright law work in their favor, even though the goals of copyright law are not 
necessarily aligned with the goals of FOSS camps.  Most FOSS licenses dictate that a 
user may do with the author’s source code what would be otherwise restricted under 
copyright law, as long as the license is maintained, along with the source code.8  An 
example if this is the GNU General Public License 3.0.9
Protecting FOSS through litigation, however, has proven more challenging than 
the licensing process, and many questions remain about the efficacy of FOSS licenses 
because FOSS projects tend to be massively communal and proliferate frequently.   For 
example, a cause of action for infringement may only be brought by the copyright 
owner.
   
10  Unless these issues are considered from the inception of a FOSS project, 
identifying the owner in FOSS projects is often difficult due to their highly collaborative 
nature.  Further, uncertainties remain regarding the enforceability of FOSS licenses.11
Section III of this article describes the anti-circumvention and CMI protection 
provisions of the DMCA, and how these two sets of provisions are intertwined.  The anti-
circumvention provisions provide a cause of action against persons circumventing a 
technological measure “that effectively controls access to a work” protected under the 
DMCA.
  In 
reviewing the prospects of legally protecting FOSS, these issues are not easily resolved, 
and the legal implications of each are significant. 
12
                                                     
8  See, e.g., Greg R. Vetter, Exit and Voice in Free and Open Source Softeare Licensing: 
Moderating the Rein over Software Users, 85 Or. L. Rev. 183, 185-86 (2006) (discussing the 
focus of open source distribution in FOSS licensing); Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source 
Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36 Rutgers L.J., 53, 71-73 (2004) 
(discussing open source software licenses generally). 
  Further, the anti-circumvention provisions include terms that protect against 
9  See The GNU Project, GNU General Public License v3.0, 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html (June 29, 2007) (allowing the licensee to copy, modify, 
and distribute works licensed under GPL 3.0.). 
10  See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006) (entitling the owner of a copyright to bring an 
infringement action). 
11  See Nimmer, supra note 3, at § 10:15 (discussing whether the terms of Free and Open 
Source Software licenses are enforceable under contract law).  
12  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), (2) (2006) (providing legal protection against the act of 
circumventing a technological measure that controls access to a work, as well as providing legal 
protection against technologies whose purpose is to circumvent a technological measure that 
controls access to a work). 
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technology whose primary purpose is to circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work,13 and technological measures whose primary 
purpose is to circumvent a technological measure that “protects a right of a copyright 
owner.”14  These provisions have received significant criticism for overstepping the 
bounds of copyright law and seemingly providing a new right to control access to 
authors’ works.15
The anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA have generally been given more 
attention in the legal community and in the media, and have more often been litigated 
than the CMI provisions.  However, it is the CMI provisions of the DMCA that may 
prove to be most beneficial to FOSS camps in litigation.  Section IV of this article 
discusses in greater detail why this holds true.  Although these provisions have rarely 
been litigated, when they have, the outcomes have generally been such that FOSS would 
have been favored.  While the DMCA has not often been viewed favorably by FOSS 
camps, the CMI provisions may be used to protect exactly that which FOSS camps value: 
that the licensing terms and conditions for use of the work remain intact.
 
16
This article suggests that solutions to some of the problems that arise in litigating 
a FOSS copyright infringement case may found in the CMI protection provisions of the 
DMCA.   The DMCA provides causes of action that, when applied in conjunction with a 
traditional cause of action for copyright infringement, and even perhaps outside of a 
copyright infringement claim, may prove to be beneficial.  The nature of FOSS often 
results in difficulty in determining the copyright owner in a particular project.  While a 
copyright infringement cause of action requires that the owner bring the action, sections 
1201 and 1202 of the DMCA do not.  Further, courts have interpreted the CMI provisions 




                                                     
13  Id. 
  The outcome of litigation regarding the CMI 
provisions in cases that do not involve software provide guidelines that show a FOSS 
infringement case may benefit from these decisions.  Specifically, the CMI provisions are 
suitable because of the way FOSS source code is created and managed.  Because FOSS 
licenses include the terms and conditions for use of a copyrighted work, they may 
14  Id. § 1201(b)(1) (providing legal protection against technologies whose purpose is to 
circumvent a technological measure that protects exclusive rights of authors). 
15  See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1095, 1106-07 (2003) 
(discussing that the right to access is a new right made available under the DMCA, and the 
implications of a right to access). 
16  See 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006) (generally covering the protection of copyright management 
information, including the notice of copyright and terms and conditions for use of the work). 
17  See IQ Group, Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ’g, LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596-97 (D.N.J. 2006) 
(holding that a watermark logo did not meet the requirements of a technological measure 
covering CMI); Textile Secrets Int’l, Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1201-02 
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding a printed pattern on fabric to not be a technological measure covering 
CMI). 
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constitute CMI under the DMCA.18
Accepting and adapting to a legal system that is not built for FOSS is not an 
innovative idea within the FOSS community.  For example, the GNU General Public 
License (“GPL”), often considered the cornerstone license of the FOSS community, came 
about for the specific reason of using what were viewed as restrictive copyright laws to 
achieve free software goals.
  This allows a plaintiff bringing a cause of action to 
potentially avoid proving the enforceability of the conditions in the FOSS license.   
19
II.  FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
  Since then, the GPL has continued to evolve along with 
intellectual property law.  Just as FOSS camps previously used copyright law to protect 
their mode of software development, FOSS camps should similarly recognize and adapt 
to the CMI provisions of the DMCA in order to enhance licensing and litigation of FOSS.   
United States copyright law provides authors of original expressions with certain 
enumerated exclusive rights in their original works.20  Within the copyright statute, 
software is considered a literary work.21  Because of this categorization, software 
copyright owners are granted exclusive rights in their source code and object code, to 
copy the work, distribute the work, and create other derivative works.22
                                                     
18  See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(6) (defining copyright management information, in part, as the 
terms and conditions for use of a work). 
 Although 
copyright law conveys exclusive rights to copy, distribute, and make derivative works of 
computer programs, those in the field have not universally accepted the value in this type 
of protection.  Certain camps of software developers, particularly FOSS camps, find that 
the software industry is best served not by providing developers with exclusive rights, but 
by allowing the source code of computer programs to remain accessible, so that anyone 
19  See John Tsai, For Better or Worse: Introducing the GNU General Public License 
Version 3, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 547, 550 (2008) (“Although Stallman was initially weary [sic] 
of copyright licenses, he eventually recognized that he could use licenses to preserve the 
freedoms of his software by ensuring that other who modified or distributed his source code 
would be bound by the licenses’ terms.” (citing Sam Williams, Free as in Freedom: Richard 
Stallman’s Crusade for Free Software 1-12 (2002)). 
20  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating the exclusive rights given to owners of 
copyrighted works). 
21  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “literary works” as 
“works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical 
symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, 
manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tables, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied”). 
22  While these are the three works most significant in software copyright cases, authors are 
also provided with the exclusive rights of public performance and public display.  See 17 U.S.C. § 
106  (enumerating the exclusive rights provided to copyright owners).   
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may copy, distribute, and make derivative works of the computer program.23
A. Free and Open Source Software in Copyright Law 
  Instead of 
shunning copyright law, these FOSS camps have developed licensing methods to use 
copyright law to support their methods of software development.   
FOSS is developed and licensed with the goal of ensuring the source code of the 
software remains open and transparent.  The means behind fostering FOSS differ 
between the two prominent camps in FOSS, including the free software camp and the 
open source camp.  Though their methods of software development are substantially the 
same, their motivations for sharing source code differ.  While these two camps may 
disagree on their fundamental motives for openly providing their source code, the 
methods used in the way the two camps develop software is essentially the same. 
1.  Free and Open Source Software 
Free software and free software licenses are largely managed by the Free 
Software Foundation (FSF), a prominent organization among the free software camp. The 
FSF is responsible for maintaining the free software definition, which defines the 
requirements for a software license to be considered a free software license. 24  The FSF 
also maintains a catalogue of licenses that meets the requirements of the free software 
definition.25 Generally, the free software definition includes four kinds of freedom that 
the free software camp believes should be inherent in using software, including the 
freedom to run the software for any reason, study how it works, redistribute copies of the 
software, and improve upon the software.26
                                                     
23  See Richard Stallman, Why Software Should Not Have Owners, in Free Software Free 
Society: Select Essays of Richard M. Stallman, 47, 47-51 (2002) (discussing why software should 
not be covered under copyright law); Glyn Moody, Rebel Code: Linux and the Open Source 
Revolution, 58-59 (2002) (discussing the importance in open source of allowing source code to 
be freely copied, distributed, and freely allowing others to make derivative works). 
  Often, the free software camp identifies 
24  The GNU Project, The Free Software Definition, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-
sw.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) (enumerating the requirements of free software). 
25  See The GNU Project, Various Licenses and Comments about Them, 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/license-list.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) (provides a list of 
covered licenses). 
26  See The GNU Project, The Free Software Definition, 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) (listing the “four kinds 
of freedom for users of software” as 1) “The freedom to run a program for any purpose;” 2) “The 
freedom to study how the program works, and change it to make it do what you wish;” 3) “The 
freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor;” and 4) “The freedom to improve 
the program, and release your improvements (and modified versions in general) to the public, so 
that the whole community benefits.”). 
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these reasons as moral and ethical grounds for developing software under free software 
licenses.27
By contrast, the Open Source camp generally focuses on the idea that keeping 
source code open results in “better quality, higher reliability, more flexibility, lower cost, 
and an end to predatory vendor lock-in.”
   
28  As such, the open source camp often cites 
more pragmatic motivations for sharing source code.  The Open Source Initiative is the 
open source camp’s United States counterpart to the Free Software Foundation.  Similar 
to the FSF, the Open Source Initiative manages the standards that comprise the open 
source definition.29  Many software licenses that are considered free software licenses are 
also considered open source licenses, though the two licensing types are neither mutually 
exclusive, nor are they completely overlapping.  The open source definition includes a 
list of ten parameters required in order for a software license to be considered an open 
source license.  Some of the requirements are similar to those found in the free software 
definition, such as freedom for distribution and creation of derivative works, and a focus 
on the availability of the source code.30  Others vary from the free software definition.  
For example, the open source definition allows authors to restrict modification of source 
code so long as the license allows for the distribution of “patch files” to supplement the 
source code at run time.31
2.  The General Public License 
 
The seminal example of a license that falls within the free software definition as 
well as the open source definition is the GNU General Public License (“GPL”).  
Originally developed by Richard Stallman, a leader of the free software camp and the 
FSF, the General Public License was created to use copyright law to protect the public 
                                                     
27  Although the differences in Free Software and Open Source Software camps may be 
negligible in practice, their motivations for that practice may have implications in how they 
protect their software. 
28  See Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) 
(describing the benefits of using Open Source as a development method).   
29  See id. 
30  The Open Source Initiative, The Open Source Definition, 
http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
31  Id. (“The license may restrict source-code from being distributed in modified form only if 
the license allows the distribution of "patch files" with the source code for the purpose of 
modifying the program at build time. The license must explicitly permit distribution of software 
built from modified source code. The license may require derived works to carry a different name 
or version number from the original software.”) 
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availability of source code.32  In an interview with Byte Magazine, Stallman described to 
readers that, regarding the GPL, they should “see it as a form of intellectual jujitsu, using 
the legal system that software hoarders have set up against them.”33  Later, in describing 
the process of developing the GPL, Stallman stated “I had to try to do what could be 
sustained by the legal system that we’re in.  In spirit, the job was that of legislating the 
basis for a new society, but since I wasn’t a government, I couldn’t actually change any 
laws.  I had to try to do this by building on top of the existing legal system, which had not 
been designed for anything like this.”34
The GPL has evolved over time, and with each subsequent version, every new 
version of the license is more aligned with developments in copyright law, and United 
States intellectual property law generally.  For example, the original GPL, published in 
1989, was somewhat basic.  Generally, it required that a person may copy, distribute, and 
modify the covered program as long as source code was made available, and the GPL 
remained with any future version of the program.
 
35  Version 2.0 of the GPL becomes 
slightly more detailed.  For example, version 2.0 includes provisions which distinguish 
between modifying the work as a whole, which requires the entire work to be licensed 
under the GPL,36 and merely aggregating the GPL-covered work with another non-GPL 
work, which does not require that the non-GPL work be licensed under GPL.37
                                                     
32  See Williams, supra note 1, at 123 (2002), available at 
http://www.oreilly.com/openbook/freedom (describing Richard Stallman’s objectives in 
developing the GPL). 
  The latest 
33  Interview by David Betz and Jon Edwards with Richard Stallman (July, 1986), available 
at  http://www.gnu.org/gnu/byte-interview.html. 
34  Williams, supra note 1, at 127-128 (2002) (describing Richard Stallman’s objectives in 
developing the GPL). 
35  See The GNU Project, GNU General Public License v1.0, 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-1.0.html (Feb., 1989). 
36  See The GNU Project, GNU General Public License v2.0, 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.html (June, 1991) (“If identifiable sections of 
that work are not derived from the Program, and can be reasonably considered independent and 
separate works in themselves, then this License, and its terms, do not apply to those sections 
when you distribute them as separate works. But when you distribute the same sections as part of 
a whole which is a work based on the Program, the distribution of the whole must be on the terms 
of this License, whose permissions for other licensees extend to the entire whole, and thus to each 
and every part regardless of who wrote it.”). 
37  See Williams, supra note 1, at 123 (“In addition, mere aggregation of another work not 
based on the Program with the Program (or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of a 
storage or distribution medium does not bring the other work under the scope of this License.”) 
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version of the GPL, version 3.0, continues to evolve along with copyright law, for 
example, by including a patent license for patented works licensed under GPL.38
B. A Typical Software Copyright Infringement Case 
 
Computer programs may be protected under copyright law in a variety of ways.  
For example, a screen display is generally protected as a visual work, while the source 
code that creates the interface displayed on a computer screen is generally protected as a 
literary work.39
As described above, source code is protected under copyright law as a literary 
work.
  Because it is the openness of FOSS source code that makes FOSS 
programs unique from proprietary software, this article will focus on the implications of 
copyright law on the source code in FOSS.   
40  United States copyright law gives authors of literary works an exclusive right to 
1) copy the copyrighted work; 2) prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted 
work; 3) distribute copies of the copyrighted work; 4) perform the copyrighted work; and 
5) to display the copyrighted work publicly.41  Copyright owners of literary works are 
allowed to bring a cause of action for infringement against any party who violates any of 
these exclusive rights.42
A complaint for infringement requires that a plaintiff plead (1) a specific 
copyrighted work that is at issue; (2) that the plaintiff is the owner of the copyright; (3) 
that registration requirements have been met; and (4) the acts that violated the plaintiff’s 
 
                                                     
38  See The GNU Project, A Quick Guide to GPLv3, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/quick-
guide-gplv3.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) (discussing the differences between GPL v. 2.0 and 
3.0). 
39  See John W. Hazard, Jr., Copyright Law in Business and Practice § 3:17 (2007) (“Source 
code and object code are protected as literary works. The screen display can, in some cases, be 
protected as an audiovisual work. The overall character of the program—the sequence, structure 
and organization—can be protected within the underlying copyright of the program.”); Atari 
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,  975 F.2d 832, 838 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (describing that 
computer programs qualify as literary works under copyright law); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. 
Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Source and object code, the 
literal components of a program, are consistently held protected by a copyright on the program.”); 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-49 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(noting that legislative history suggests that programs are considered copyrightable as literary 
works). 
40  Hazard, supra note 38, at § 3:17. 
41  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5) (2006) (enumerating exclusive rights provided to authors 
under copyright law). 
42  See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006) (“The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under 
a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411 [17 USCS § 411], to institute an 
action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.”). 
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rights.43
C. Difficulties in Proving Infringement in FOSS  
  Regarding software, a plaintiff must be able to show: (1) the specific original 
work that is at issue; (2) that the plaintiff owns the copyright in the original work; (3) that 
the work has been registered; and (4) that one of the plaintiff’s exclusive rights has been 
infringed.  In cases involving only one developer who has properly registered the work, 
these requirements might not be so difficult to meet.  However, challenges arise when 
considering non-traditional development methods. 
The terms of FOSS licenses often are often contradictory to the terms of 
proprietary software licensing schemes, which are more often litigated in courts.  Because 
of the distinction in the terms of the license, protecting FOSS in litigation can prove 
challenging for a number of reasons.  For example, a traditional copyright infringement 
action may only be brought by a copyright owner.44  However, a copyright owner is 
defined as the author or authors of the work.45
1.  Determining the Copyright Owner 
 A typical FOSS project may have many 
contributors and, thus, the evolution of a particular project may cause difficulty in 
identifying the owner of the copyright.  Additionally, the efficacy of the terms of FOSS 
licenses is still not fully settled by the courts.  One complexity in asserting the terms of a 
FOSS license is determining whether they create a valid contract.  In the same manner, 
identifying damages is problematic because the economic value of FOSS projects is 
difficult to calculate.   
The ability to bring a claim of copyright infringement against an allegedly 
infringing party lies solely with the legal or beneficial owner of the right being 
infringed.46  Typically, ownership lies with the author, or authors, of the work.47
                                                     
43  6 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 19:3 (2009) (discussing the minimum elements 
required in an infringement complaint, but noting that an ideal complaint include “(1) that 
defendant had access to an original work of authorship; (2) that defendant violated specific 
exclusive rights granted in section 106 or section 106A, owned by plaintiff at the time of the 
infringement; (3) that the alleged acts of infringement occurred within the statute of limitations 
period; and (4) that the statutory requirements of registration had been fulfilled.”). 
  If more 
44  See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (“The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a 
copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411 [17 USCS § 411], to institute an 
action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.”). 
45  See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). 
46  See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (“The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a 
copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411 [17 USCS § 411], to institute an 
action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.”). 
47  See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(b) (describing ownership under copyright law).  
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than one author contributes to a joint work, the authors become joint-owners of the 
copyright.48  For example, Some FOSS projects may be managed more centrally, where a 
core group of developers monitor alterations to a project, and have third party developers 
grant back ownership of the copyright.49
a. Joint Works 
  However, others FOSS projects are less centric 
and, in these cases, ownership is more difficult to distinguish.  In massively collaborative 
FOSS projects where ownership is not explicitly defined, it becomes necessary to 
characterize the development of the FOSS work to determine ownership rights.  
Generally, works that are created by multiple authors may be characterized as joint 
works, derivative works, or collective works. 
A work is considered a joint work if each of the authors intended to collaborate 
with the others, or if the authors created their work with the intent it would be merged 
with other works to create a single inseparable work.50  Generally, the difference lies in 
the intent of the authors.  In the case of FOSS projects, it is mostly likely that the author 
intends that their work will be used in collaboration with other authors to create one 
indivisible work.51  In a joint work, all the co-authors have equal ability to bring a cause 
of action for infringement for the entire work.52
The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have developed a two-pronged test for 
joint authorship, called the “intent to be co-authors” standard.
  Accordingly, in massively collaborative 
works, as is common with FOSS projects, intending the work to be a joint work may be 
beneficial.  However, when FOSS becomes massively collaborative, providing joint 
ownership to minority contributors might be detrimental. 
53
                                                     
48  See Id. § 201(a) (“The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyrights in the work.”). 
  The test requires that to 
show joint authorship, each of the co-authors must establish that they: “(1) made 
independently copyrightable contributions to the work, and (2) fully intended to be co-
49  See Nimmer, supra note 3, at § 10:22  (explaining the difficulty in determining the owner 
in a FOSS project). 
50  See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (“[A] work is ‘joint’ if the authors collaborated with each other, or if 
each of the authors prepared his or her contribution with the knowledge and intention that it 
would be merged with the contributions of other authors as ‘inseparable or interdependent parts 
of a unitary whole.’”). 
51  And maybe FOSS licenses should state explicitly that a work is a joint work, or, 
alternatively, set up a system for ownership to resolve standing issues. 
52  See Nimmer, supra note 3, at § 10:23 (2009) (describing the differences in ownership 
between joint works, collective works, and derivative works). 
53  Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:” Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights 
and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 48-49 (2001) (discussing the 
development of the two-pronged test). 
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authors.”54  In FOSS projects, authors building on FOSS expect that their original work 
will be merged with the original work of the original author.  However, two issues 
remain.  The first issue is that the original author must have intended for the work to be 
part of a collaborative work at the time of authorship.55  The second issue is that both 
authors must intend at the time of their original authorships that all authors are joint 
authors.56
The consequences of co-ownership in a joint work are even less clear, as the 
governing law is found in case law rather than statutory law.
 
57  Some of these 
consequences include “(1) the minimal contribution to a work required for joint 
authorship; (2) the percentage of ownership interest amongst joint authors; (3) which co-
owners can grant licenses and what licenses can be granted by a co-owner; (4) how co-
owners must account to each other for profits; and (5) restrictions on co-owners’ rights to 
exploit a copyright.”58  For all these reasons, joint authorship is often not optimal for 
FOSS projects, especially in massively collaborative cases.59
b. Derivative Works 
 
Another possibility for characterizing FOSS collaborative projects is that a second 
author building on the work of a first author in a FOSS project may create a derivative 
work, rather than a joint work.  This is the case when the second author creates a “new, 
separate work, owned by the new author but incorporating elements from the earlier work 
with permission of the first author.”60
                                                     
54  Id. (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507-08 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
  Considering a case where the first author 
55  See Raymond T. Nimmer, Legal Issues in Open Source and Free Software Distribution, 
885 PLI/Pat 33, 77 (2006) (“[I]n copyright law, the idea of joint authorship does not per se 
require that coauthors work at the same time on the work. It is sufficient that they both intend at 
the time that they create their expression that their "contributions [will] be merged into 
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."). 
56  Id. 
57  See Peter H. Karlen, Joint Ownership of Moral Rights, 38 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 242, 
247 (1991) (“Unfortunately, the Act does not spell out all the consequences of co-ownership; 
rather, decades of litigation have refined the rules governing joint authorship and co-ownership.). 
58  Id. 
59  See Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 Utah L. 
Rev. 563, 624 n.176 (2004) (“While a determination of joint ownership among the contributors to 
an open-source project would upset the open-source licensing scheme, this risk explains in part 
the need for a license that asserts ownership in the original author for her contribution, and then 
grants conditional rights to others.”). 
60  Nimmer, supra note 3, at § 10:23 (2009) (describing the differences in ownership 
between joint works, collective works, and derivative works). 
Vol. XII The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2011  
172  
developed the work under GPL 3.0, the first author would have clearly granted 
permission for the second author to create a derivative work.61  Upon developing a 
derivative work, ownership of the copyright would lie with the first author to the extent 
the original work is part of the derivative work, and to the second author to the extent the 
second author has added new original authorship to the original work.62
Thus, to bring a cause of action for infringement of the entire derivative work, it 
must be brought both by the original author, as well as the second author.  Problems arise 
when FOSS projects become massively collaborative because each contributor has 
exclusive ownership of the copyright in that specific part of the work.  For extensive 
FOSS projects, such as the Linux operating system, this becomes problematic.  “Given 
the growing expanse of users working collaboratively, today's Linux is less a seamless 
piece of coding than a tapestry of hundreds of hackers' contributions.”




The third potential characterization of a FOSS project would be a collective work, 
or compilation.64
2.  FOSS Licenses and Contract Law 
  This would occur in a centrally managed FOSS project, where 
developers might each develop an independent portion of the project.  In these cases, 
each developer would have exclusive rights in the section he or she authored.  
Accordingly, in this type of project, bringing an infringement action against an infringing 
party would require all of the individual authors. 
Because the objectives of developers using FOSS licensing methods run askew 
from those generally targeted by copyright law, FOSS licenses provide unique legal 
challenges in litigation.  One of these challenges involves determining how, exactly, to 
enforce FOSS licenses.  Specifically, one important legal issue that arises is whether the 
terms of FOSS licenses create enforceable contract provisions.65
                                                     
61  See The GNU Project, GNU General Public License 3.0, 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html (June 29, 2007) (“Each time you convey a covered 
work, the recipient automatically receives a license from the original licensors, to run, modify and 
propagate that work, subject to this License.”). 
 
62  See Nimmer, supra note 3, at § 10:23 (2009) (describing the differences in ownership 
between joint works, collective works, and derivative works). 
63  Nimmer, supra note 3, at § 10:22 (2009) (explaining the difficulty in determining the 
owner in a FOSS project). 
64  See Nimmer, supra note 3, at § 10:23 (2009) (describing the differences in ownership 
between joint works, collective works, and derivative works). 
65  Nimmer, supra note 3, at § 10:15 (2009) (discussing whether the use of FOSS licenses 
creates an enforceable contract). 
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In Jacobsen v. Katzer, the plaintiff, Jacobsen, brought a cause of action against 
defendant Katzer under both copyright infringement and contract law.66  The Federal 
Circuit held that the terms of the Artistic License established not merely enforceable 
contract provisions, but also enforceable licensing conditions that govern the rights to 
modify and distribute the software.67 The Federal Circuit found this distinction important 
because “a ‘copyright owner who grants a nonexclusive license to use his copyrighted 
material waives his right to sue the licensee for copyright infringement’ and can sue only 
for breach of contract.”68
Although the Federal Circuit has determined that FOSS licenses can create 
enforceable contracts, and within that, enforceable copyright licensing conditions, some 
questions remain.  Specifically, “[t]o what extent can license drafters choose whether a 
particular license provision is a pure covenant or a license condition?”
  Specifically, because FOSS is often distributed freely, or for 
minimal cost, the economic damages traditionally provided under copyright law are often 
not as valuable to FOSS developers as an injunction, which is provided under copyright 
law. 
69  An example 
where this arises is in the digital rights management (“DRM”) provisions within GPL 
3.0.70  Specifically, the provision that allows for the removal of DRM.71
                                                     
66  See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1377  (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
  For a provision 
67  Id. at 1382 (“The clear language of the Artistic License creates conditions to protect the 
economic rights at issue in the granting of a public license. These conditions govern the rights to 
modify and distribute the computer programs and files included in the downloadable software 
package.”). 
68  Id. at 1380 (citing Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
69  Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Contracts: Tales from a 
Test of the Artistic License, 17 Tex. Intell. Prop L.J. 335, 351 (2009) (identifying this as the most 
important question remaining after the Jacobsen decision). 
70  Id. at 352 (“The DRM Section, though situated in the midst of licenses, is not connected 
to the licenses in any obvious way.  It does not, on the face of it, look to be a condition on any of 
the surrounding license grants. It appears to be a standalone contractual provision; in other words, 
a pure covenant”). 
71  The GNU Project, GNU General Public License v3.0, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-
3.0.html (June 29, 2007)   (“When you convey a covered work, you waive any legal power to 
forbid circumvention of technological measures to the extent such circumvention is effected by 
exercising rights under this License with respect to the covered work, and you disclaim any 
intention to limit operation or modification of the work as a means of enforcing, against the 
work's users, your or third parties' legal rights to forbid circumvention of technological 
measures.”); see also Richard Stallman, Why Upgrade to GPL 3.0, 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/rms-why-gplv3.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) (“GPLv3 ensures 
you are free to remove the handcuffs. It doesn't forbid DRM, or any kind of feature. It places no 
limits on the substantive functionality you can add to a program, or remove from it. Rather, it 
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in a license to be considered not merely a covenant but a licensing condition, breach of 
the provision must result in copyright infringement.72
III.  THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 
 Thus, although categorizing the 
DRM provision in GPL 3.0 as a licensing condition would allow for more “optimal” 
damages in the form of an injunction, the question remains whether breach of a provision 
that is not related to copyright infringement allows a plaintiff to obtain an injunction 
against the breaching party, or whether damages would be limited to traditional economic 
damages. 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was enacted in 1999 to further 
align copyright law in the United States with the international community.  Specifically, 
the DMCA was enacted in response to the World Intellectual Property Organization 
Copyright Treaty that required participating states to provide legal protection against 
circumvention of technological controls in copyrighted works.73  The result is that the 
DMCA provides protection for technologies used to control access to copyrighted 
material, copyright infringement, and copyright management information.74
 The DMCA is comprised of five sections directed to alternative copyright 
protection.  This article focuses on the first two sections of the DCMA.  Within those two 
sections, this article focuses on two specific sets of provisions: the anti-circumvention 
provisions; and the CMI protection provisions.  The first section of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 1201, includes a set of provisions directed to anti-circumvention measures. This section 
of the DMCA prohibits circumvention of technological measures whose purpose is to 
protect a copyrighted work.
 
75  Section 1201 also includes other legal protection related to 
anti-circumvention measures, such as encryption research76
                                                                                                                                                              
makes sure that you are just as free to remove nasty features as the distributor of your copy was to 
add them.”). 
 and protection of personally 
72  See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 68, at 344 (“As such, breach of a license condition 
covenant can trigger copyright infringement, not merely breach of contract. Pure contractual 
covenants, as previously mentioned, only can trigger breach of contract.”). 
73  See Burk, supra note 14, at 1103 (discussing the history of the anti-circumvention 
provisions in the DMCA); Cohen, supra note 5, at 166-169 (1997) (discussing the requirements 
for legal protection under the WIPO Treaty). 
74  See Nimmer, supra note 3, at § 1:40 (2009) (“Digital works are uniquely susceptible to 
rapid and perfect copying, but digital technology also can limit use and establish notice of 
copyright claims.  These limiting technologies may be important to shape the market for works, 
while protecting against infringement.  The [DMCA] creates a protective legal structure 
associated with these limiting technologies.  The statute provides for civil and criminal sanctions 
against persons who disable or circumvent technological restrictions on access to or infringement 
of rights in the work.”). 
75  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006). 
76  Id. § 1201(g). 
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identifying information,77 but for purposes of this article, the anti-circumvention 
provisions refer to the provisions under Section 1201 that provide a cause of action 
against parties circumventing technological measures put in place to control access to a 
copyrighted work.78  The second set of provisions that this article will address, and which 
are the focus of this article, are found under 17 U.S.C. § 1202.  These provisions provide 
legal protection for the integrity of copyright management information, including 
identifying information about the work, and terms and conditions for use of the work.79
Some commentators have suggested that these provisions grant new rights to 
copyright holders outside of the traditional exclusive rights granted to owners of 
copyright.  In fact, some have named these provisions as providing “paracopyrights.”
   
80  
However, other commentators have insisted that the DMCA does not provide any new 
“rights,” but merely provides new causes of action for copyright owners to employ in 
protecting their works.81
Some courts have construed section 1201 and section 1202 to be symbiotic in 
protecting against circumvention of technological measures used to protect copyrighted 
works, and have used this relationship in construing the terms of the two sets of 
provisions.
  What is commonly agreed on is that the DMCA provides 
protection for works that arise along side a traditional copyright infringement claim.  
Because legal protections provided under the DMCA are separate and independent from 
infringement claims, there may be causes of action brought under traditional copyright 
infringement statutes that have no DMCA causes of action.  Similarly, there are causes of 
action available under the DMCA that are available to a plaintiff where the plaintiff may 
not be able to bring a cause of action for copyright infringement. 
82
Similarly to the relationship between infringement and DMCA actions, there may 
be situations which allow a plaintiff to bring a cause of action under the anti-
circumvention provisions as well as the CMI protection provisions of the DMCA.  
Additionally, there may be situations in which a plaintiff may bring a cause of action 
under the anti-circumvention provisions, where a cause of action may not be available 
  However, despite their relationship the two sets of provisions are often 
utilized individually in litigation to bring separate, independent causes of action.   
                                                     
77  Id. § 1201(i). 
78  Id. § 1201(a)-(b). 
79  17 U.S.C. § 1202(a), (c) (2006). 
80  See Burk, supra note 14, at 1096 (2003) (“Paracopyright as conferred by the DMCA 
constitutes a separate set of rights, quite distinct form any copyright in the underlying content.”). 
81  See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (noting that 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) and (b) establish a cause of action for liability, but not a 
new property right). 
82  See IQ Group, Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ., LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596-597 (D. N.J. 2006) 
(interpreting § 1202 by analyzing the relationship between § 1201 and § 1202 using legislative 
history suggesting that “Congress viewed §§ 1201 and 1202 together as preventing circumvention 
of the 'technological measures' referred to in § 1201”). 
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under the CMI protection provisions.  In the same manner, a plaintiff may bring a cause 
of action under the CMI protection provisions but not be able to bring a cause of action 
under the anti-circumvention provisions.   
A. Prohibiting Circumvention of Protection Measures for Copyrighted Works 
Section 1201 of the DMCA provides legal protection for technological measures 
used to control access to a copyrighted work and to control a copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights in the work.83  In addition, the anti-circumvention provisions provide legal 
protection against products or services that are “primarily designed or produced for the 
purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure.”84  
Discussions of these provisions are more prevalent in legal journals and have been more 
widely reviewed in courts than their CMI protection sister provisions.  Accordingly, 
courts and legal scholars have provided substantially more guidance on the construction 
and proper use of these provisions.  Because the anti-circumvention provisions provide 
copyright owners with measures for relief outside of the exclusive rights traditionally 
provided under copyright law, the provisions are often considered overly restrictive and 
the most controversial provisions of the DMCA.85
FOSS camps, particularly the free software camp, have been vocal about the 
dangers of accepting the anti-circumvention measures of the DMCA.
 
86  Open source 
communities have advocated against the DMCA to some extent, but not to the same 
degree as free software camp.87
                                                     
83  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a); see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 458 
(2007) (noting in dicta that Congress is aware of the ease at which software is copied and 
identifying 17 U.S.C. § 1201 as a result backed by “the efforts of copyright owners to protect 
their works from piracy behind digital walls such as encryption codes or password protections.” 
(citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
  However, in both camps, there largely remains 
84  17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1)(A). 
85  See Nimmer, supra note 3, at § 1:42 (2009) (“The most controversial portions of the 
DMCA create rights with respect to technology used by copyright owners to prevent access to 
copyrighted works or to prevent copying, distribution, or other uses of the works in violation of 
the copyright owner’s rights.  These DMCA provisions deal with preventing circumvention of 
technology controls and with trafficking in technology that enables such circumvention.”). 
86  See, David Turner, Reaction to the DRM clause in GPL v3 (May 17, 2010),  
http://www.fsf.org/blogs/licensing/gplv3-drm  (detailing reactions to DRM measures in GPL 3.0).  
See generally Defective by Design, http://www.defectivebydesign.org/, (last visited Feb. 19, 
2011) (dedicated to the campaign by the Free Software Foundation to avoid access restricting 
technological measures).  
87  See, Linus Torvalds, Just for Fun: The Story of an Accidental Revolution 207-208 (2002) 
(acknowledging the benefits of copyrights, and that copyright law in general remains “mild and 
well behaved,” but asserting that the DMCA takes authors’ rights too far) (notably Torvlads does 
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skepticism of the far reaching implications of the DMCA, and especially the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA. 
There are three major provisions in the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
DMCA.88  The first provides legal protection against circumvention of a technological 
measure that affects ability to access a covered work.89  The second provision also 
involves control of access to a copyrighted work.  Specifically, it involves “any 
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof” whose primary purpose 
is to circumvent technological measures meant to control access to the work.90  The third 
provision, found under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) provides similar protection against any 
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof” whose primary purpose 
is to “circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects 
a right of a copyright owner.”91
1.  Protecting Access  
  Accordingly, while the first and second provisions are 
directed to the protection of access to a copyrighted work, the third provision is directed 
to the protection of the copyright owner’s rights.  
Some argue that the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA provide a new 
exclusive right: access.92  Whether or not this is the case, it is clear that the DMCA 
provides, at the least, new causes of action regarding access that are outside the 
traditional exclusive rights provided to copyright owners.  In comparing the two anti-
trafficking provisions that fall within the anti-circumvention provisions, 17 U.S.C. § 
1201(a)(2) and 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1), this becomes apparent.  Specifically, these two 
sections are nearly identical except that section 1201(a)(2) includes the phrase 
“technological measure that effectively controls access of a work protected under this 
title,”93 whereas section 1201(b)(1) includes the term “technological measure that 
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title.”94
                                                                                                                                                              
not distinguish between the anti-circumvention measures and the CMI provisions, as Richard 
Stallman and Professor Eben Moglen are more apt to do).  
  Accordingly, while it 
88  Again, I remind the reader that when I refer to the anti-circumvention provisions in the 
DMCA, I am referring to 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) and 17 U.S.C.§ 1201(b). 
89  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). 
90  Id. § 1201(a)(2). 
91  Id. § 1201(b). 
92  See Burk, supra note 14, at 1106-07 (discussing the new “right of access” made available 
under the DMCA, and the implications of a right of access); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink 
Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 establishes a 
cause of action for liability, but not a new property right). 
93  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
94  Id. § 1201(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
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is clear that the DMCA is not intended to provide a new right to copyright owners, it does 
provide legal protection not previously available for technological measures that control 
access to copyrighted works. 
Determining whether there is a technological measure that controls access is an 
issue that has not been fully resolved in the courts.  In Davidson & Associates v. Jung, the 
Eighth Circuit provided an analysis in a case where the plaintiff had controlled access to 
its copyrighted games using a CD key.95  The defendant had developed an “emulator” 
that effectively allowed access to features of the plaintiff’s software that would not 
normally be available without the CD key.96  The defendant (the appellant in this case) 
asserted that the controlled features are “a strictly functional process that lacks creative 
expression, and thus DMCA protection does not apply.”97  The Eighth Circuit disagreed, 
finding that the literal elements of the code for the features were not strictly functional, 
and were not freely available outside of using the key.  Thus, the court found that 
summary judgment was proper and the DMCA was applicable.98
In Davidson, the Appellants relied on the case Lexmark International, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., as showing that the features were not covered by the 
DMCA.
 
99  In Lexmark, Lexmark was the owner of a toner loading program, which 
measured the amount of toner remaining in an ink cartridge and is stored on a microchip 
in the cartridges.100  Lexmark transferred an authentication sequence between the chip 
and the printer to ensure that the user was only using Lexmark cartridges for the printer.  
Each Lexmark printer included a second program, the Printer Engine Program, which 
controlled the functionality of the printer.  If the authentication sequence failed, the 
printer would not function properly.101  Static Control Components (“SCC”) developed 
the SMARTEK chip, which it implemented and distributed on refurbished cartridges in 
order to circumvent the authentication sequence.102  The SMARTEK chip also contained 
an exact copy of Lexmark’s toner loading program.103
                                                     
95  See Davidson & Assoc. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 640-641 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming the 
district court’s decision that anti-circumvention is applicable because the secret handshake CD 
key was more than strictly a functional process, and that appellants violated DMCA by 
circumventing the secret handshake CD key). 
  Lexmark brought an action 
96  Id. at 640. 
97  Id. at 640. 
98  Id. at 641. 
99  Id. at 640. 
100  See Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 529-30 (6th 
Cir. 2004). 
101  Id. at 530. 
102  Id.  
103  Id. at 530-531. 
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against SCC, citing the anti-trafficking provision under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).104  The 
Sixth Circuit disagreed, finding that “[i]t is not Lexmark’s authentication sequence that 
‘controls access’ to the Printer Engine Program.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).  It is the 
purchase of a Lexmark printer that allows “access” to the program.”105
An important question in determining whether a technological measure controls 
access is: What, exactly, is the subject of the controlled access.  Under the DMCA, the 
control must be over access to a copyrighted work.  In both of these cases, the 
technological measure used to control access was a key to be used in a three-way 
handshake in order to authenticate a connection.  The difference is that the three-way 
handshake used to control access in Davidson was used to authenticate source code,
   
106 
whereas the three way handshake in Lexmark was merely used to render the code 
operable.107  The code was available to anyone who had access to the Lexmark printer.108  
Conversely, the code in Davidson was only accessible after using the three-way 
handshake.109
2.  Protecting the Rights of the Copyright Owner  
 
As described above, the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA provide for 
the legal protection of technological measures to ensure access to a copyrighted work.110  
Similarly, the DMCA provides legal protection for technological measures meant to 
protect the rights of the copyright owner.111  In Chamberlain, the Federal Circuit 
identified and explained the symbiotic relationship between these two provisions; 
specifically, because controlling access was not previously protected under copyright 
law, the additional device limitations had to be created for both copyright protection as 
well as access.112
                                                     
104  Id. at 545-546. 
 
105  Id. at 546  
106  Davidson & Assoc. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2005). 
107  Lexmark Intern., Inc., 387 F.3d at 529-30. 
108  See Id. at 546 (“Anyone who buys a Lexmark printer may read the literal code of the 
Printer Engine Program directly from the printer memory, with our without the benefit of the 
authentication sequence.”). 
109  Davidson & Assoc., 422 F.3d at 640-41 (8th Cir. 2005). 
110  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
111  See id. § 1202(b)(1). 
112  See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs, Inc. 381 F.3d 1178, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (“The prohibition in 1201(a)(1) [was] necessary because prior to [the DMCA], the conduct 
of circumvention was never before made unlawful. The device limitation in 1201(a)(2) enforces 
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In Coupons, Inc. v. Slottlemire, the plaintiff offered printable coupons to 
consumers online. 113  When a consumer attempted to print a coupon, plaintiff’s software 
stored a registry key on the user’s computer, such that the user was prevented from 
printing coupons after a pre-set limit was reached.114  The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant “created software that removed the key” and “provided the method and the 
software to others” in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) and (b).115  The court denied a 
motion to dismiss the claim, finding that these allegations were sufficient for a cause of 
action under §1201(b).116
In Coupons, the district court relied on plaintiff’s argument that the key 
simultaneously prevented access, as well as prevented the consumer to make copies or 
distribute the coupon.  Similarly, in Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc., the 
district court, in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, found that a 
plaintiff would be likely to prevail where the technological measure to prevent access 
would inherently protect rights of a copyright owner by controlling access to the work.
 
117  
This was also the case in 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., where the 
court disagreed with the defendant’s assertion that the technological measure was 
configured to control access and not copying.118
For these reasons, it appears that the anti-circumvention section regarding 
protection of rights of the copyright owner is not as strong as that which protects against 
circumvention regarding access control.  When one can find circumvention of measures 
taken to control access, it seems to almost always be the case that the same measure 
could be found to circumvent technological measures meant to protect rights of the 
copyright owner. 
 
The importance of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA lies in the 
technological aspects that control access to the covered work and what exactly is being 
                                                                                                                                                              
this new prohibition in conduct. The copyright law has long forbidden copyright infringements, 
so no new prohibition was necessary. The device limitation in 1201(b) enforces the longstanding 
prohibitions on infringements.”) (quoting S.Rep. No. 105-90 at 12 (1998)). 
113  Coupons, Inc. v. Stottlemire, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. at 1074-1075. 
117  See Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Tech's, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 
2007) (“Here, CAPTCHA both controls access to a protected work because a user cannot proceed 
to copyright protected webpages without solving CAPTCHA, and protects rights of a copyright 
owner because, by preventing automated access to the ticket purchase webpage, CAPTCHA 
prevents users from copying those pages.” (emphasis in original)). 
118  See 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096 
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (“While 321 is technically correct that CSS controls access to encrypted DVDs, 
the purpose of this access control is to control copying of those DVDs, since encrypted DVDs 
cannot be copied unless they are accessed.”). 
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protected by that technological measure.119  Accordingly, a cause of action under 17 
U.S.C. § 1201 will fail unless a plaintiff can show a viable infringement count. 120
B. Preserving the Integrity of Copyright Management Information 
 
Similarly to the anti-circumvention provisions, the CMI protection provisions 
under section 1202 provide causes of action that will often arise alongside traditional 
copyright infringement actions.  Generally, copyright management information covers 
“information conveyed in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or 
performances or displays of a work, including digital form.”121  There are two main 
provisions that cover CMI protection in the DMCA.  First, 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a) protects 
against false copyright management information.  Second, 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b) protects 
against removal or alteration of CMI.  Within the two main provisions, there are two 
common elements.  The two provisions both include a mental element requirement.122
1.  Mens Rea 
  
The other major element found in both major provisions involves identifying what 
actually comprises CMI.   
Whereas copyright infringement may occur without the infringer knowing or 
having a reason to know that his or her acts constituted infringement, 123 actions brought 
under the anti-circumvention provisions and CMI protection provisions of the DMCA 
require a specific mens rea.124
                                                     
119  See Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 549-550 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (stating “it is not the SCC chip that permits access to the Printer Engineer Program but 
the consumer’s purchase of the printer”). 
  Thus, establishing the mental element may, in some cases, 
120  Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech's, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203-1204 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (holding that infringement must exist in some form). 
121  See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2006) (listing eight examples of copyright management 
information, including information identifying the work, terms and conditions for use of the 
work). 
122  See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 12A.10[A][1]; 
§ 12A.10[B][1][b] (2009) (discussing the mental element requirement of the two main CMI 
provisions of the DMCA). 
123  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006) (stipulating that a court may find infringement “[i]n a 
case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving , and the court finds that such infringer 
was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of 
copyright.”). 
124  See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, supra note 121, at §§ 12A.10[A][1], [B][1][b] 
(discussing the mental element of the two main CMI provisions of the DMCA). 
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prove to be challenging in developing a DMCA claim.  However, in other cases, 
establishing the mental element may not be a substantial obstacle.  
Regarding disseminating false CMI, the actor must act knowingly, and with the 
intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement.125  The mens rea requirement 
for actions brought because of removal or alteration of CMI is more elaborate, but also 
requires that the actor act knowingly or intentionally.126  The first subsection provides a 
cause of action for CMI that has been altered or removed intentionally.127  Accordingly, 
the intent lies in the action of altering or removing CMI.  In the second subsection, a 
cause of action is provided for distributing or importing for distribution CMI “knowing 
that the [CMI] has been removed or altered without authority of the copyright owner or 
the law.”128  Accordingly, in the second subject, the intent element lies in the 
precondition that upon distributing the CMI, the actor knew that it had been removed or 
altered.  Finally, in the third subsection, a cause of action is provided for distribution or 
importation for distribution, or public performance of works, copies of works, or 
phonorecords “knowing that the CMI has been removed or altered without authority of 
the copyright owner or the law.”129
The mental elements of the CMI protection provisions of the DMCA have been 
reviewed in a few cases throughout the country.  The case Kelly v. Arriba identifies the 
significant dichotomy in the subsections involving removal or alteration of CMI.
  Thus, bringing a cause of action for removal or 
alteration of CMI requires that the removal or alteration was intentional, while 
distribution or importation does not require intent to alter or remove CMI.  Rather, the 
latter two subsections require knowledge that the CMI was removed or altered. 
130  In 
Kelly, a district court in the Central District of California reviewed a case where the 
defendant provided a web search engine which stored and indexed photos in a database, 
and displayed a thumbnail version of the image when it was searched.131
                                                     
125  17 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (2006). 
  The plaintiff 
brought a cause of action against the defendant for displaying the thumbnail images 
126  See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d. 1116, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (finding no 
DMCA violation in part because the plaintiff had not shown requisite intent); see also Gordon v. 
Nextel Commc'ns, 345 F.3d 922, 927 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff had not shown that “the copyright 
information was removed with reasonable grounds to know that it would ‘induce, enable, 
facilitate, or conceal an infringement.’”). 
127  17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(1). 
128  Id. at § 1202(b)(2). 
129  Id. at § 1202(b)(3). 
130  Kelly, 77 F. Supp. 2d. at 1122 (finding no DMCA violation in part because the plaintiff 
had not shown requisite intent); 
131  Id. at 1117. 
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without their corresponding copyright information.132  The court noted that the plaintiff 
had erroneously brought a cause of action under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(1), rather than 17 
U.S.C. § 1202(b)(3).133  Section 1202(b)(1) requires that the defendant acted intentionally 
in removing or altering CMI.134  The plaintiff should have brought a cause of action 
under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(3) because the plaintiff was not alleging that the CMI was 
removed from the original work, but from a copy (i.e., the thumbnail).135  Under section 
1202(b)(3) it is a violation of the DMCA to distribute a work knowing that the CMI was 
removed or altered unlawfully, and knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that it 
will “induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal an infringement.”136
Another example of the courts reviewing the mental element is in Gordon v. 
Nextel Communications.
   
137  In that case, the Sixth Circuit reviewed a motion for 
summary judgment in a case in which original artwork by Gordon was visible in a Nextel 
television commercial with its copyright information removed.138  The Nextel 
commercial was produced by Mullen Advertising, who worked with Crossroads, a 
production company.139  Gordon sued Nextel, along with Mullen Advertising, under 17 
U.S.C. § 1202.140  The defendants argued that they received Gordon’s artwork from a 
prop company with the CMI already removed, and thought that it had been cleared for 
use in the television commercial.141  The Sixth Circuit sided with the defendants, granting 
summary judgment and finding that there was no evidence to show that the CMI was 
removed with reasonable grounds to know that it would “induce, enable, facilitate, or 
conceal an infringement.”142
These two cases show that the mental element of section 1202 can provide 
somewhat of a barrier in bringing a DMCA claim.  However, the requirement may not be 
 
                                                     
132  Id. at 1121. 
133  Id. at 1122. 
134  Id.  
135  Id. 
136  17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(3) (2006). 
137  Gordon v. Nextel Commc'ns, 345 F.3d 922, 927 (6th Cir. 2003)  
138  Id. at 923. 
139  Id. at 926. (The Sixth Circuit found naming Crossroads a party in the suit unnecessary 
because Mullen Advertising could still be found to be vicariously liable. “[T]he case law suggests 
that it is permissible for a plaintiff to name as a defendant one who is liable only as a vicarious 
infringer without also naming the ‘direct’ infringer as a defendant.”). 
140  Id. at 923. 
141  Id. at 927. 
142  Id. at 927.   
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a complete bar.  For example, in Gordon, the Sixth Circuit determined that no evidence 
was provided to show that Crossroads had any reason to know that the removal would 
facilitate infringement because they were relying on another party to have cleared the 
work for use in the commercial.143
2.  Identifying CMI 
  The outcome may have been different if the party 
who actually took the work and removed the CMI would enable or conceal infringement. 
The other major element found in both major provisions involves identifying what 
actually qualifies as copyright management information.  The DMCA defines CMI as 
information conveyed on connection with a work, including: 
 
“(1) The title and other information identifying the work, including the 
information set forth on a notice of copyright. 
(2) The name of, and other identifying information about, the author of the 
work. 
(3) The name of, and other identifying information about, the copyright 
owner of the work, including the information set forth in a notice of 
copyright. 
(4) With the exception of public performances of works by radio and 
television broadcast stations,  the name of, and other identifying 
information about, a performer whose performances is fixed in a work 
other than an audiovisual work. 
(5) With the exception of public performances of works by radio and 
television broadcast stations, in the case of an audiovisual work, the name 
of, and other identifying information about, a writer, performer, or director 
who is credited in the audiovisual work. 
(6) Terms and conditions for use of the work. 
(7) Identifying numbers or symbols referring to such information or links 
to such information. 
(8) Such other information as the Register of Copyrights may prescribe by 
regulation, except that the Register of Copyrights may not require the 




The courts first interpreted what is covered by CMI in IQ Group, Ltd. v. Wiesner 
Pub., LLC. 145
                                                     
143  Id. at 927. 
  The New Jersey district court reviewed a motion for summary judgment 
by the defendant.  IQ Group was hired by NSAC and Capital Care to create 
144  See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2006) (providing a list of information that comprises copyright 
management information). 
145  IQ Group, Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ., LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D. N.J. 2006).  
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advertisements and distribute them via e-mail to insurance agents.146  The advertisements 
included IQ Group’s logo, which was configured to direct a user to IQ Group’s website 
upon clicking on the logo.147 After IQ Group distributed the advertisement, NSAC and 
Capital Care hired Wiesner, a rival of IQ Group, to distribute the advertisements via e-
mail.148 Wiesner removed the IQ Group logo and hyperlink, added new contact 
information for NSAC and Capital Care, and distributed the advertisements.149  IQ Group 
applied for, and received, copyright registration in the advertisement, and subsequently 
filed suit against Wiesner, alleging in part a violation of the DMCA under 17 U.S.C. § 
1202.150  Wiesner moved for summary judgment that the DMCA claim should be 
dismissed as a matter of law, asking the court to rule that a logo does not constitute CMI 
under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c).151
The district court determined that the legislative history shows that sections 1201 
and 1202 were intended to be used together “as preventing circumvention of the 
‘technological measures’ referred to in 1201.”
 
152  The court found that because 1201 and 
1202 should be construed together, CMI must be in the form of a technological 
measure.153  Further, the court warned of “blurring the boundaries between trademark law 
and copyright law.”154  The court found that “[t]o come within § 1202, the information 
removed must function as a component of an automated copyright protection or 
management system,” and because IQ Group’s logo “did not function as a component of 
an automated copyright protection or management system, it does not fall within the 
definition of [CMI].”155
Although this interpretation of CMI is rather limiting, this holding has not been 
consistent with other court decisions.  In Textile Secrets International, Inv. V. Ya-Ya 
Brand, Inc., a California district court considered a case where the plaintiff, Textile 
Secrets International (“TSI”) owned a copy in a fabric design, and the copyright 
 
                                                     
146  Id. at 589. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. at 591. 
152  Id. at 596-97 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-551 (1998); and S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998)).  
153  Id. at 596 (“Furthermore, the reports show that Congress viewed §§ 1201 and 1202 
together as preventing circumvention of the “technological measures” referred to in § 1201.”). 
154  See id. at 592 (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 
(2003)). 
155  IQ Group, Ltd., 409 F. Supp. 2d at 597-98. 
Vol. XII The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2011  
186  
information was printed on the selvage of the fabric.156  TSI argued that Ya-Ya Brand 
violated 17 U.S.C. § 1202 by removing the copyright information listed on the selvage, 
and proceeding to copy the fabric design.  The district court evaluated the scope of CMI, 
and determined that it applied only when technological measures are required for removal 
or distribution of the copyrighted work.157  Thus, unlike IQ Group, the court in Textile 
Secrets International did not go so far as to limit CMI to being a technological measure, 
but found that a technological process must be used either to place the copyright 
information on the fabric, or remove it from the fabric.158
One other case that exemplifies the diverse analysis of the scope of CMI is 
McClatchey v. Associated Press.
 
159  In this case, the district court in Pennsylvania 
reviewed a case where McClatchey had taken a photograph of the crash of United Flight 
93 on September 11, 2001, for which she received federal copyright protection.160  
McClatchey alleged that a reporter for the Associated Press had taken a photograph of her 
photograph and cropped her CMI out of the picture.161
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the copyright 
information did not qualify as CMI under the DMCA because it was not digital.
   
162  
McClatchey argued that she used a software program to generate the copyright 
information on each of the printouts of the photograph.163
                                                     
156  See Textile Secrets Intern., Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1192 (C.D. 
Cal. 2007) (“The sample yardage had markings on their selvage that listed plaintiff’s name and 
the copyright symbol.”). 
  The court found that the terms 
of the definition for CMI under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) read broadly define CMI as 
including “any of the information set forth in the eight categories, ‘including in digital 
157  See Id.  at 1201-02 (“The Court nevertheless cannot find that the provision was intended 
to apply to circumstances that have no relation to the Internet, electronic commerce, automated 
copyright protections or management systems, public registers, or other technological measures 
or processes as contemplated in the DMCA as a whole.”). 
158  Id. (“[A]lthough the parties do not dispute that the [fabric] contained TSI’s copyright 
information, there are no facts to show that any technological process as contemplated in the 
DMCA was utilized by plaintiff in placing the copyright information onto the [fabric], or that 
defendants employed any technological process in either their removal of the copyright 
information from the design or in their alleged distribution of the design.”). 
159  McClatchey v. Associated Press, No. 05-cv-145, 2007 WL 776103 (W.D. Pa. March 9, 
2007). 
160  Id. at *1. 
161  Id. at *2. 
162  Id. at *2. 
163  Id. at *5. 
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form.’”164
C. Interplay between Anti-Circumvention and CMI Provisions 
  Thus, by applying the facts of the case most favorably to the plaintiff, the 
court found that the facts of the case did not arise to the level required to grant summary 
judgment to the defendant. 
Together, sections 1201 and 1202 are two branches of copyright law that work 
along side traditional rights granted under the Copyright Act to protect authors.  
Commonly, a case is brought under both sets of provisions of the DMCA.165  However, 
the two sets of provisions do not always arise together.  Some cases are brought solely 
under the anti-circumvention provisions .166  Other cases are brought as a CMI action, 
without an anti-circumvention action.167
IV.  THE CASE FOR USING THE CMI PROVISIONS OF THE DMCA TO PROTECT FOSS 
  This article acknowledges that in some 
situations a case may be brought under only 17 U.S.C. § 1201, or under both 17 U.S.C. § 
1201 and 17 U.S.C. § 1202.  However, these cases will be set aside for purposes of this 
article.  Rather, this article focuses on those cases that are brought under 17 U.S.C. § 
1202, as well as traditional copyright infringement actions. 
The DMCA is often viewed as overly restrictive, inhibiting creativity rather than 
encouraging it.168  This is especially true in FOSS camps.169
                                                     
164  Id. at *5. 
  Because of the backlash 
165  See Stockwire Research Group, Inc. v. Lebed, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 
2008) (causes of action brought under 17 U.S.C. § 106, 17 U.S.C. § 1201, and 17 U.S.C. § 1202). 
166  See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 2004). 
167  See Rosenthal v. MPC Computers, LLC, 493 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 (D. Mass. 2007) 
(causes of action brought under 17 U.S.C. § 501 and 17 U.S.C. § 1202); Gordon v. Nextel 
Commc’ns., 345 F.3d 922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003) (causes of action brought under 17 U.S.C. § 106 
and 17 U.S.C. § 1202); Polar Bear Products., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 
2004) (causes of action brought under 17 U.S.C. § 101 and 17 U.S.C. § 1202). 
168  See John Y. Kim, The Great Kaleidescape: New Hope in the Digital Rights Debate, 27 
Temp. J. Sci. Tech. & Envtl. L. 339, 355 (2008) (noting that DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. 
Kaleidescape, Inc. highlights the DMCA as “overly restrictive”). 
169  See Torvalds, supra note 86, at 207-208 (acknowledging the benefits of copyrights, but 
acknowledging that the DMCA takes authors’ rights too far); see also The GNU Project, GNU 
General Public License v3.0, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html (June 29, 2007) (“When 
you convey a covered work, you waive any legal power to forbid circumvention of technological 
measures to the extent such circumvention is effected by exercising rights under this License with 
respect to the covered work, and you disclaim any intention to limit operation or modification of 
the work as a means of enforcing, against the work's users, your or third parties' legal rights to 
forbid circumvention of technological measures.”). 
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from FOSS camps after the enactment of the DMCA, it is not surprising that these camps 
have not often utilized copyright management information provisions in protecting their 
works.170  However, since the inception of the GNU General Public License, FOSS has 
thrived on using copyright law to its advantage, even when copyright laws seemingly fly 
in the face of FOSS objectives.171
Developers in FOSS camps are not strangers to employing copyright laws to 
create a sustainable software development method suited to their particular objectives.  
The GPL exemplifies the ability of FOSS communities to work with copyright law for its 
own benefit.
  While protecting FOSS using traditional copyright 
infringement actions may prove challenging in some respects, the CMI provisions of the 
DMCA provide causes of action that have become uniquely suited for FOSS.  
172  The development of the GPL was an ingenious way to take copyright law 
that was seen as restrictive and develop a method for protecting an ideology that software 
should be free.  With each release of the GPL, modifications have been made to keep up 
with innovations both in the technology and in the law.173
The CMI provisions of the DMCA have rarely been litigated and there remains 
little guidance in using these provisions.  Even more infrequently have the courts 
reviewed the CMI in view of software, the cases that have been litigated provide some 
guidance on how the CMI provisions of the DMCA provisions should be litigated in the 
future.  By reviewing even those cases that do not touch software issues, some guidance 
can be found as to how future cases may be decided.   
   
In reviewing case law that is directed to the CMI provisions, as well as what is 
found in treatises, it becomes clear that the CMI provisions of the DMCA may be 
especially valuable in protecting FOSS along with a traditional claim for infringement.  
Because an act of infringement of software will often involve removing or amending an 
appended license, it will often be the case that both actions may be brought.  For the 
                                                     
170  See Turner, supra note 85 (detailing reactions to DRM measures in GPL 3.0).  See, 
generally, Defective by Design, http://www.defectivebydesign.org/, (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) 
(dedicated to the campaign by the Free Software Foundation to avoid access restricting 
technological measures). 
171  See Williams, supra note 1, at 127 (“As hacks go, the GPL stands as one of Stallman's 
best. It created a system of communal ownership within the normally proprietary confines of 
copyright law. More importantly, it demonstrated the intellectual similarity between legal code 
and software code.”). 
172  Two other examples are the Creative Commons and Science Commons licenses. Creative 
Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).  Here, the Free Software 
Foundation created a license inspired by the GPL to allow authors to easily license their works for 
free to the public.  Creative Commons, History, http://creativecommons.org/about/history/(last 
visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
173  Compare The GNU Project, GNU General Public License, version 1 (Feb. 1989), 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-1.0.html; with, The GNU Project, GNU General 
Public License, version 2 (June 1991), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.html.  
See also Tsai, supra note 18, at 564-572 (identifying the two major differences in GPL 3 from 
GPL 2 as the clarification of the scope of the license and the inclusion of an express patent 
license). 
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purposes of this article, I have identified two specific challenges that arise in FOSS 
litigation which might be advantaged by bringing a cause of action under the CMI 
protection provisions of the DMCA.  First, a cause of action brought under the CMI 
provisions would circumvent the need to identify the copyright owner in FOSS, which 
can be challenging because of the communal, and often highly collaborative, 
development practices in FOSS projects.  Second, the CMI provisions do not require the 
plaintiff to prove the enforceability of FOSS license terms, as copyright management 
information covers not only licenses but modification or removal of terms of service.  
A. Standing 
One of the first challenges that a litigant must overcome in bringing any suit is to 
demonstrate proper standing.  As described above, only the legal or beneficial owner of a 
copyright is permitted to bring an action for infringement.174  Further, the owner must 
have registered the copyright prior to bringing a cause of action.175
The collaborative nature of FOSS means that the owner or owners of the 
copyright of the work may be difficult to identify.  For example, different licensing 
schemes within FOSS may or may not require that each author for every part of the 
source code.  Some projects may have centralized management, such as a core group or 
organization that regulates contributions from others in the community.  In these cases, 
contributors will grant back their copyright ownership to the core group or 
organization.
 
176  The Free Software Foundation often uses this type of management to 
create one “official” version of a project, although other unofficial versions of the project 
would not be illegal.177
In massively collaborative works, issues in identifying copyright owners arise 
when there is not a central manager for the project.  As described in section two, when 
multiple authors contribute original works of authorship covered under copyright law, 
there are various ownership schemes into which the common project could fall, including 
  In these cases, because ownership is granted back to a core 
group, owners of the copyright are easy to identify. 
                                                     
174  See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006) (“The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under 
a copyright is entitled subject to the requirement of section 411, to institute an action for any 
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.”). 
175  See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006) (“Except for an action brought for violation of the rights of 
the author under section 106A(a), and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no action for 
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or 
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”). 
176  See Nimmer, supra note 3, at § 10:22 (2008) (discussing centrally managed projects 
requiring contributors to grant back ownership, or provide a license to the core organizers). 
177  Id. § 10:22 n. 2 (“A licensee that desires its code to become part of the "official" version 
must submit it to that supervisory group. The FSF, for example, in such cases typically requires a 
written transfer of the copyright to it.”). 
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joint ownership, derivative works, and compilations.178
One way in which the CMI provisions of the DMCA are favorable to a FOSS 
plaintiff is that many courts have construed the DMCA as not limiting standing to the 
copyright owner.
  Further, as described above, each 
of these types of ownership may prove to be problematic in an infringement suit because 
identifying the correct owners of the copyright to have proper standing becomes 
increasingly difficult the larger and more collaborative the project becomes. 
179  In Echostar Satellite, L.L.C. v. Viewtech, Inc., a district court in the 
Southern District of California found that plaintiff Echostar had standing to bring a 
DMCA claim even though it was not the copyright owner because Ecostar contracted for 
distribution rights from the copyright owner.180  The court found that the DMCA offers 
standing to “any person allegedly injured by a violation of sections 1201 and 1202 of the 
DMCA.”181
In RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., a district court in the Western District of 
Washington found similarly.
 
182  The plaintiff, RealNetworks brought a DMCA under 17 
U.S.C. § 1201 against Streambox, Inc.183  RealNetworks had a product that allowed users 
to stream audio and video content over the Internet.  The streamed content was secured 
against unauthorized access or copying in part by using a “secret handshake” to create a 
secure connection.184  Streambox, Inc. allegedly circumvented the secret handshake in 
order to allow users to download the streamed content.185  Accordingly, the copyright 
owner was not RealNetworks, Inc., but a third party author.  The court found that 
RealNetworks, Inc. was permitted to bring a cause of action because 17 U.S.C. § 1203 
“affords standing to ‘any person’ allegedly inured by a violation of sections 1201 and 
1202 of the DMCA.”186
Unfortunately, the idea that standing in a DMCA claim does not require the 
copyright owner is not held everywhere.  In Chamberlain Group, the Federal Circuit 
 
                                                     
178  See id. § 10:22 (2009) (explaining the difficulty in determining the owner in a FOSS 
project). 
179  See Echostar Satellite, LLC v. Viewtech, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1205 (S.D. Cal. 
2008) (“Nothing in the DMCA limits standing to the copyright owner.  Instead, the statute states 
that any person injured by a violation of section 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action in an 
appropriate United States district court for such violation.”). 
180  Id. 
181  Id. at 1205. 
182  RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 99-cv-02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *6 (W. D. 
Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (finding the plaintiff has standing under 17 U.S.C. § 1201). 
183  Id. at *1. 
184  Id. at *2. 
185  Id. at *4. 
186  Id. at *6. 
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reviewed the provisions of the DMCA.187  The Federal Circuit determined that the 
DMCA does not create new rights in copyright law, but instead provides new causes of 
action for copyright owners.188  Because of this, the Federal Circuit held that one of the 
requirements to prove a violation under section 1201(a)(2) is “ownership of a valid 
copyright on a work.”189
B. FOSS Licenses as CMI 
 
Much of the litigation arising from the CMI provisions of the DCMA surround 
the issue of pinning down exactly what is covered by CMI.  Further, as described above, 
a major issue in protecting FOSS is determining how to categorize the terms of FOSS 
licenses as either licensing conditions or contractual covenants.  One potential solution is 
to categorize the FOSS license as CMI. 
A review of the case law as analyzed above reveals that most courts agree that 
CMI must be related to some technological measure. In Textile Secrets, the court found 
that in order  for copyright information to be CMI, it must relate to some technological 
measure, such as public registers or automated copyright systems.190  In McClatchey, the 
court found even less of a relationship was necessary between the copyright information 
and the technological measure, finding it sufficient that the plaintiff’s use of a software 
program to generate CMI on prints of her work.191
Similarly to the outcome in McClatchey, in Jacobsen v. Katzer, the plaintiff 
contended that he “used a software script to automate adding copyright notices and 
information regarding the license and uploaded the files on the internet through 
SourceForge.net, an open source incubator website.”
 
192  The court chose to follow IQ 
Group and found that there had been “some” technological process involved in protecting 
the copyright management information and did not dismiss the DMCA claims on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion.193
                                                     
187  See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(providing a six element test for a claim under section 1201). 
 
188  Id. 
189  Id. at 1203. 
190  See Textile Secrets Int’l., Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1201-02 (C.D. 
Cal. 2007) (“[T]he Court nevertheless cannot find that the provision was intended to apply to 
circumstances that have no relation to the Internet, electronic commerce, automated copyright 
protections or management systems, public registers, or other technological measures or 
processes as contemplated in the DMCA as a whole.”). 
191   McClatchey v. Associated Press, No. 05-cv-145, 2007 WL 776103, at *5 (W.D. Pa. 
March 9, 2007). 
192  Jacobsen v. Katzer, 609 F. Supp. 2d 925, 934 (N. D. Cal. 2009). 
193  Id. at 934. 
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FOSS projects are often created using development tools that inherently have an 
automated copyright system such that as the software is created, the license is 
automatically proliferated through the project.  Further, as was the case in Jacobsen, 
many developers use automated methods for adding copyright notices to the work, and 
use public registers, such as SourceForge.net for the development of FOSS.194  Further, 
the FOSS license itself provides the terms and conditions for use of the covered work, 
and as such fall into the CMI definition in the DMCA.195
One potential hurdle in considering FOSS licenses to be CMI is found in GPL 3.0.  
Specifically, GPL 3.0 includes a provision directed to the DMCA, which states “No 
covered work shall be deemed part of an effective technological measure under any 
applicable law fulfilling obligations under article 11 of the WIPO copyright treaty 
adopted on 20 December 1996, or similar laws prohibiting or restricting circumvention of 
such measures.”
  Because FOSS licenses are 
often associated with public registers, such as SourceForge.net, and software licenses are 
often automatically added to source code during development, FOSS licenses meet the 
general standards of the technological measure required by most courts to be considered 
CMI. 
196  The provision is clearly directed toward the anticircumvention 
provisions found under 17 U.S.C. § 1201.  However, the concern arises from the many 
courts who read sections 1201 and 1202 as a single unit.197  If a court is to consider 
copyright information to be a technological measure in order to be valid CMI, as in IQ 
Group,198
C. Remedies 
 then there is potential that a court might find the GPL 3.0 to have waived any 
causes of action available based on technological measures.  However, one might argue 
that the license itself is not considered a covered work under its own language.  Because 
of the ambiguity that exists in determining the scope of CMI under the DMCA, it might 
be advisable to amend the GPL to express that while the software covered by the license 
is not to be considered a technological measure, the license itself is a technological 
measure for the purposes of section 1202. 
As described above, one of the most important reasons in an infringement action 
for the terms of FOSS licenses to be considered licensing conditions rather than 
                                                     
194  Geeknet, http://geek.net/our-network/sourceforge (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
195  17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2006). 
196  The GNU Project, GNU General Public License v3.0, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-
3.0.html (June 29, 2007). 
197  See, e.g., IQ Group, Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ’g, LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. N.J. 
2006) (“Furthermore, the reports show that Congress viewed §§ 1201 and 1202 together as 
preventing circumvention of the ’technological measures’ referred to in § 1201”). 
198  Id. at 596 (finding that CMI must be in the form of a technological measure as required 
by the DMCA). 
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contractual covenants is to be able to obtain an injunction against an infringing party.  If 
the terms were to be construed as contractual language, then the plaintiff would be likely 
to receive monetary damages, which is the traditional form of relief in a contract claim.  
However, if the court construes the claims to be licensing conditions, then the plaintiff 
may obtain an injunction, which is more common under copyright law. 
If the FOSS plaintiff were to bring a cause of action under the CMI provisions of 
the DMCA, and be successful, the plaintiff would be awarded remedies as discussed 
under the DMCA.199  These remedies include not only awarding of statutory or actual 
damages,200 but also provide the court with the power to grant temporary and permanent 
injunctions “on such terms as it deems reasonable to prevent or restrain a violation.”201
V.  CONCLUSION 
  
Accordingly, bringing a cause of action for violation of the DMCA along with an 
infringement claim would provide a second chance to reach the end goal of an injunction. 
Because the objectives of software development in FOSS projects requires unique 
forms of protection, FOSS camps have found methods to use copyright law that is 
seemingly restrictive and use it to protect their own highly unrestricted works.  Although 
the DMCA is seen as especially restrictive, FOSS camps should view it as providing a 
new set of tools that FOSS developers may hack to preserve their unique objectives.  
When bringing a claim of infringement against an infringing party, there are situations in 
which bringing a claim for violation of the DMCA is not available, or not feasible.  
However, in the situations where it is feasible, bringing a claim for violation of the 
DMCA may provide an extra route for litigants to be able to obtain an injunction against 
infringing parties. 
 
                                                     
199  See 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006).   
200  See id. § 1203(c). 
201  See id. § 1203(b). 
